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[Sal'. No. 5741. In Bank. Feb. 27. 1946.J

WEST PUBLISHING COMPANY (a Corporation), Appellant, v. CRAS. J. McCOLGAN, as Franchise Tax
Commissioner. etc., Respondent.
[la. 1bJ Taxation-Income Taxes--CorporatioDS.-lt is not a violation of the due process clause to subject an out-of-state law
book publishiug company to the Corporation Income Tax Act
(Stats. 1937, ch. 765, p. 2184, as amended; Deering's Gen.
Laws, Act 8494a) where it ships books into the state pursuant
to orders taken by its regularly employed solicitors who devote their entire time to soliciting orders, receiving payments,
adjusting complaInts, collecting delinquent accounts, etc., and
where it stores books in attorneys' offices which it advertises
as its local offices. By virtue of such activities the company
is present in the state, and it receives such benefits and pr0tection of the statE' laws as justify the tax.
[2] ld. - Income Taxes--Corporations.-The Corporation Income
[1] See 27 Am.Jur. 414.
McK. Dig. Reference: [1-6] Taxation., § 458.
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Tax Act is not subject to constitutional objection on the
ground that it imposes a tax on income of a foreign corporation engaged in the state solely in interstate commerce.
Id. - Income Taxp-Corporations.-The Corporation Income
Tax Act does not discriminate again~t interstate commerce
by reason of the provision making the tax inapplicable to
income to be included in th€' mel€ure of the tax under the
Bank and Corporation Franc!bise Tax Act (8tats. 1920, p. 19,
as amended; Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 8488), and allowing an
offset for the tax imposed under that act, siIKle this provision
precludes double taxation of corporations subject to that act,
and the tax burden imposed thereby is at least equal to that
imposed by the income tax act.
Id. - Income T&xes-Corpor&tions.-The CorpOration Income
Tax Act is not objectionable as discriminating against interstate commerce merely because a foreign corporation's entire
income is taxable in its domiciliary state.
Id. - Income Taxes - Corporations. - A foreign corporation
cannot complain of errors in computing its income tax liability
in that the tax is based on its gross receipts from its business
in interstate commerce, or that its business is unitary and its
income is not allocated to this state and others as required,
where it refused to file a return on demand by the Franchise
Tax Commissioner and where it failed to exhaust its administrative remedies by seeking a correction when it applied for
a refund of the tax paid.
Id.. - Income Taxes-Corporations.-Income of a foreign corporation from its activities carried on in this state in interstate commerce is subject to taxation under Corporation Income Tax Act. § 3.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Sacramento County. Da} M. Lemmon, Judge. Affirmed.
Action for refund of corporation income tax collected.
Judgment for defendant affirmed.
John W. Preston for Appellant.

I

"

Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General, and John L. Nourse
and James E. Sabine, Deputies Attorney General, for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff, a Minnesota corporation, with its
principal place of business in St. Paul, Minnesota, is engaged
in the business of selling law books and other pUblications
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throughout the United States and in foreign countries. It
has not qualified to do i~trastate business in California.
[1 a] During 1937, 1938. and 1939 it shipped books and other
publications into this dte pursuant to orders taken here b~'
its employees. During this time it had four regularly employed solicitors in this state J.l1ho devoted t.heir entire time to
plaintiff's business. Its California~ employees were authorized
to receive payments on orders taken by them, to collect delinquent accounts, and to make adjusWlents in case of complaints by customers. The employees were given space in the
offices of attorneys in return for the use of plaintiff's books
stored in such offices. In legal newspapers and periodicals
published and circulated in California, plaintiff advertised
as its local offices those occupied by its employees. It refused
to file returns under the California Corporation Income Tax
Act (Stats. 1937, ch. 765, p. 2184, as amended by Stats. 1939,
ch. 1049, p. 29u2j Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 8494a)- for the
taxable years 1937, 1938 and 1939, or to furnish any information requested by the Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax
Commissioner (hereinafter referred to as commissioner). The
commissioner, pursuant to section 18(a) of the act, made assessments based upon his estimate of the amount of net income
derived by plaintiff from sources in California. The commissioner collected part of the amounts so assessed pursuant
to the withholding procedure provided in section 25 of the
act, and plaintiff brought this action to obtain a refund of
the amounts so collected. Defendant filed an answer as well
as a counterclaim for. the unpaid part of the assessment.
The trial court entered judgment for defendant and plaintiff appeals.
[2] Plaintiff contends that the tax in question is unconstitutional on the grounds that California cannot impose a tax
on any part of the net income of a foreign corporation engaged exclusively in interstate commerce and that the tax
·Section 3 of the act, as enacted in 1937, provides: "There shall be
levied, collected and paid for each taxable year, a tax at the rate of
four per cent upon the net income of every corporation derived from
sources within this State on or after January 1, 1937; provided, however, that the income of any corporation which is included in the measure
of the tax imposed by the Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax Act,
Statutes 1929, Chapter 13, as amended, shall not be mbjeet to the tax
imposed by this act. Income from sources within this State includes
income from tangible or intangible property located of having a situs in
this State and income from any n~ti\'ities carried on in this State, regardleu of whether calried em in intraai&te, int;erstate or foreip commerce."
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discriminates against interstate commerce and violates the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment t.o the
Constitution of the United States. It also contends that
it has no income ft:om sources in California within the
meaning of the act.
.,
The Corporation Income Tax Act is complementary to the
Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax Act. (Stats. 1929, ch.
13, p. 19, as amended; Deering's ~n. Laws, Act 8488.) The
subject of the tax under the first is net income. Under the;
second it is the privilege of exercising corporate franchises
in this state. "A franchise tax is a tax imposed upon a corporation for the right or privilege of being a corporation or
doing business in a corporate capacity." (Flint v. Stone.
Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 [31 S.Ct. 342, 55 L.Ed. 389]; Pacific
Co. Ltd. v. Johnson, 212 Cal. 148, 154-155 [298 P. 489].)
Such a tax is inapplicable to a corporation engaged exclusively in interstate commerce for "a state may not impose ai
charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by the federal
Constitution. Thus, it may not exact a license tax for the
privilege of carrying on interstate commerce . • • although
it may tax the property used in, or the income derived from
that commerce, so long as the taxes are not discriminatory."
(Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 113 [63 s.Ot. 870,
891, 87 L.Ed 1292, 146 A.L.R. 81]; General Trading Co. v.
State Tax Com., 322 U.S. 335, 338 [64 S.Ot. 1028, 1030, 88:
L.Ed. 1309, 1319]; McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Min-'
ing Co., 309 U.S. 33, 56-58 [60 S.Ct. 388, 84 L.Ed. 565, 128
A.L.R. 876]; Western Live Stock v. Bureau, 303 U.S. 250
[58 S.Ct. 546, 82 L.Ed. 823, 115 A.L.R. 944] ; Alpha Portland'
Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203 [45 S.Ot. 477, 69'
L.Ed. 916]; see, also, Cheney Bros. Co. v. Massachusetts, 246
U.S. 147 [38 S.Ot. 295, 62 L.Ed. 632]; Ozark Pipe Line Co.:
v. Monier, 266 U.S. 555 [45 S.Ct. 184, 69 L.Ed. 439]; Anglo.';
Chilean Nitrate Sales Corp. v. Alabama, 288 U.S. 218 [5;3
S.Ot. 373, 77 L.Ed. 710]; Atlantic Lumber Co. v. CommiS~
sioner, 298 U.S. 553, 555 [56 S.Ct. 887, 80 L.Ed. 1328].) - ~
In relying on the foregoing cases for the proposition that"
a foreign corporation engaged within a state solely in inter-;
state commerce is immune from net income taxation by that'
state, plaintiff overlooks the distinction made by the United
States Supreme Court between a tax whose subject is the
privilege of engaging in interstate eommeree and a tax whose'
.subject is the net income from such commerce. It is settled.~t
1
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decisions of the United :;;tates Supreme Court that a tax on
net income from inters~te commerce, as distinguished from
a tax on the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce, does
not conflict with the commerce clause. (United States Glue
00, v. Town of Oak Oreek, 247 ".S. 321, 326, 329 [38 S.Ct.
499, 62 L.Ed. 1135]; Shaff~ v. Oarter, 252 U.S. 37, 57 [40
S.Ct. 221, 64 L.Ed. 445]; Underwood Typewriter 00. v. Ohamberlain, 254 U.S. 113, 119-120 [41 S.Ct. 45, 65 L.Ed. 165];
Bass, Ratcliff &7 Gretton, Ltd., v. Siate Tax 00711.., 266 U.S.
271 [45 S.Ct. 82, 69 L.Ed. 282]; Atlantic Ooast Line R. 00.
v. Daughton, 262 U.S. 413, 416 [43 S.Ct. 620, 67 L.Ed. 1051];
Butler Bros. v. McOolgan, 315 U.S. 501 [62 S.Ct. 701, 86
L.Ed. 991].) A state "may tax net income from operations
in interstate commerce, although a tax on the commerce is
forbidden, U.S. Glue 00. v. Oak Oreek, 247 U.S. 321 [38 S.Ct.
499, 62 L.Ed. 1135]; Shaffer v. Oarter, supra. Congress may
levy a tax on net income derived from the business of exporting merchandise in foreign commerce, although a tax upon
articles exported is prohibited by constitutional provision. . . .
Peck &7 00. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165 [38 S.Ct. 432, 62 L.Ed.
1049} ; Barclay &7 00. v. Edwa.rds, 267 U.S. 442, 447 [45 S.Ct.
348,69 L.Ed. 135]." (New York ex ret Oohn v. Graves, 300
U.S. 308, 313-314 [57 S.Ct. 466, 81 L.Ed. 668, 108 A.L.R.
721].) "But it was not the purpose of the commerce clause
to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce of their just
share of state tax burdens, merely because an incidental or
consequential effect of the tax is an increase in the cost of
doing business. . . . A tax may be levied on net income wholly
derived from interstate commerce." (McGoldrick v. BerwindWhite Ooal Mining 00., 309 U.S. 33, 46 [60 S.Ct. 388, 84 L.
Ed. 565, 128 A.L.R. 876), italics added.) State power to
impose a tax on net income wholly derived from interstate
commerce was recently reaffirmed in Memphis Natural Gas
00. v. Beeler, 315 U.S. 649, 656 (62 S.Ct. 857, 86 L.Ed. 1090] ;
see, also, International Ha1'vester 00. v. Wisconsin, 322 U.S.
435, 442 [64 S.Ct. 1060, 88 L.Ed. 1373}.) Such power is so
well recognized that appeals questioning it are dismissed b~'
the United States Supreme Court for want of a substantial
federal question. (Memphis Natural Gas 00. v. State Tax
00711.., 323 U.S. 682 [65 S.Ct. 440, 89 L.Ed. 553], 88lM
case, - - Miss. - - (19 So.2d 477]; Parke Davis &7 00. V.
Oook, 323 U.S. 681 [65 S.Ct. 436, 89 L.Ed. 552], same
case 198 Ga. 457 [31 S.E.2d 728J.)
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The use of income as the measure rather than the subject
of the tax in the Bank and 'Corporation Franchise Tax Act
is in confonnity with a .r»cthod of taxing national banks authorized by section 5219 of the United States Revised Statutes
that permits the inclusion of income: in the measure of the
tax that could not be made the s~ject of the tax. (Pacific
Co., Ltd. v. Johnson, 212 Cal. 148 [298 P. 489], 285 U.S.
480 [52 S.Ot. 424, 76 L.Ed. 893]; Educational Films Corp. v.
Ward, 282 U.S. 379 [51 8.Ct. 170, 75 L.Ed. 400]; Flint v.
Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 [31 S.Ot. 342~ 55 L.Ed. 389].) I
The use of income as the subject of the tax in the Corporation
Income Tax Act is in confonnity with the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, cited above, that a state may
tax net income from interstate commerce even though it cannot tax the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce.
Before the enactment of the Corporation Income Tax Act,
foreign corporations engaged in interstate business within the
state without being subject to a tax burden comparable to the
franchise tax imposed on domestic corporations and other
foreign corporations competing in the same market. The Corporation Income Tax Act removed that discrimination.
[3] There is no discrimination against interstate commerce
in the provision of the Corporation Income Tax Act making
the tax inapplicable to income that a corporation must include
in the measure of the tax under the Bank and Corporation
Franchise Tax Act and allowing an offset for the tax imposed
on the corporation under that act. This provision precludes
a double burden on corporations subject to the latter act.
The tax burden imposed by the Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax Act is at least equal to that imposed by the Corporation Income Tax Act. It is settled that a tax does not discriminate against interstate commerce if other related taxes
impose equal burdens on local commerce. (Gregg Dyeing Co.
v. Query, 286 U.S. 472 [52 8.Ot. 631, 76 L.Ed. 1232]; Interstate Busses Corp. v. Blodgett, 276 U.S. 245 [48 S.Ot. 230,
72 L.Ed. 551]; Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577
[57 S.Ot. 524, 81 L.Ed. 814]; Southern Pacific Co. v. GaUagher, 306 U.S. 167 [59 S.Ot. 389, 83 L.Ed. 586].)
[4] Nor is there any merit to the contention that the act
discriminates against interstate commerce on the ground that
it subjects part of plaintiff's income to double taxation, given
the taxability of plaintiff's entire net income in the state of
its domicile. Taxation in one state is not an immunization.
aaainst taxation in other &tate&. (Btat. T~ COt1&. y. ~
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316 U.S. 174 [62 S.Ot. 1008, 86 L.Ed. 1358, 139 A.L.R. 1436];
Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357 [59 S.Ot. 900, 83 L.Ed. 1339,
123 A.L.R. 162] j GrCJl)es v. Elliott, 307 U.S. 383 [59 S.Ot.
913, 83 L.Ed. ]356]; Guaranty Trust Co. v. Virginia, 305
U.S. 19 [59 S.Ot.~, 83 L.Ed. 16].) Taxation by states in
which a corporation carries on business activities is justified
by the advantages that attendAhe pursuit of such activities.
(Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney 'co., 311 U.S. 435, 446 [61 S.Ot.
246, 85 L.Ed. 267, 130 A.L.R. 1229].) "Income may be
taxcd both by the state where it is eanted and by the state
of the recipient's domicile. Protection, benefit and power
over the subject matter are not confincd to either state."
(State Tax Com. v. Aldrich, supra, at p. 178; Curry v. McCanless, supra, at p. 367.)
[6] Plaintiff contends that the tax is void on the ground
that it was imposed on the gross receipts from its business in
interstate commerce. Section 18(a) of the act provides: "If
any taxpayer, upon notice and demand by the commissioner,
fails or refuses to make and file a return required by this act,
the commissioner is authorized to make an estimate of the
net income and to compute and levy the amount of the tax
due under this act from any available information." Plaintiff was repeatedly requested to furnish information before
the assessment but refused to do so. The record discloses that
the commissioner's only information as to plaintiff's income
from California sources related to its gross sales to California
customers. This information was not furnished in any return
made by the taxpayer. It was acquired by the commissioner
from the State Board of Equalization, which had been infornied by plaintiff's accountants that its gross revenue from
California sources averaged $160,000 a year. To cover the
possibility that the actual amount of its gross income attributable to California that would have been revealed on a return
would be higher than this amount, the commissioner estimated that $200,000 represented such income. Net income is
defined by the act as gross income less the deductions allowed.
The commissioner estimated that plaintiff's deductions would
amount to 80 per cent of its gross income and computed the
tax on an estimated net income of $40,000. There is no proof
that these estimates were too high, and there is nothing in the
record to discount the possibility that they might even be
too low. No question was raised either in the claim for refund filed with the commissioner or in the p'lea.dings filed in

)
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this action concerning the amounts of the assessments; plaintiff merely contended that no tax could be validly imposed.
It chose this way of challenging the state's authority to impose the tax, taking the risli that if such authority existed its
position in court would be that of,a delinquent taxpayer that
has failed to exhaust its admin.wtrative remedies. (Alexander
v. State Personnel Board, 22 Ca1.2d .3.98 [137 P.2d 433].) If
the commissioner erred in his computation, the errOL' could
easily have been avoided by giving him the necessary information at the outset, or it could have beeil corrected by giving i
the necessary information upon the filing of the claim for refund. Plaintiff cannot complain of alleged errors in the computation of tax liability, when it refused to avail itself of its I
administrative remedies to prevent or correct such errors.'
(Universal Cons. ml Co. v. Byram, 25 Ca1.2d 353, 361, 362
[153 P.2d 746]; Dawson v. County of Los Angeles, 15 Ca1.2d
77, 81 [98 P.2d 495]; Los Angeles etc. Co. v. County of Los
Angeles, 162 Cal. 164, 168 [121 P. 384] ; People v. Keith Railway Equipment Co., 70 Cal.App.2d 339, 346, 347 [161 P.2d
244] ; People v. Richardson, 37 Cal.App.2d 275, 281 [99 P.2d
366] ; Alexander v. State Personnel Board, supra; Abelleira v.-·
District Court of Appeal, 17 Cal.2d 280 [109 P.2d 942, 132
A.L.R. 715]; Gorham Mfg. Co. v. State Tax Oom., 266 U.S.
265 [45 S.Ot. 80, 69 L.Ed. 279]; see 51 Am.Jur. 698-699.)
The same answer must be given to plaintiff's contention that
its business was a unitary business and that its income was I
not allocated to this state and others in conformity with sec-.
tion 13 of the act. (See Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 17 Ca1.2d i
664 [111 P.2d 334], aff'd 315 U.S. 501 [62 8.Ct. 701, 86 L.Ed.·
991].) Allocation under section 13 could not be made without
the information that plaintiff alone could supply. "Litigants
may not, by refusing or neglecting to submit issues of fact to
such agencies, by-pass them, and call upon the courts to deter~
mine in a suit such as this, matters properly determinable
originally by such agencies." (People v. Keith Ra~'lway
Equipment 00., 70 Ca1.App.2d 339, 346 [161 P.2d 244].)
[6] Plaintiff contends that it has no income from sources.
in California within the meaning of the act on the ground
that income derived from activities in furtherance of a purely;
interstate business does not have a source within this state;_;
This eonclusion is contrary to the express provision of
act that "income from sonrces within thiR state includes ••"li.
income from &n3. activities carried on in this state, regard~
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less of whether carried on in intrastate, interstate or foreign
commerce." All of the cases cited uy plaintiff (Department
of Treasury v. International TI~ester 00., 221 Ind. 416 [47
N.E.2d 150]; Oomml~ssioner of Internal Revenue v. Piedras
Negras Broadcasting Co., 127 F.2d 260; Compania General de
Tabacos v. Oollector of Internal Revenue., 279 U.S. 306 r49
S.Ct. 304, 73 L.Ed. 704]; Cmnmissifmer of 1nternal Revenue
v. East Coast Ot"l 00. S. A., 85 1j!.2d 322), involved statutory
construction rather than constitutional power, and none of
them involved a statute like the act in question which expressly defines income from sources withjn the state as including income from any activities carried on in the state.
[lb] Plaintiff contends that the tax violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution
of the United States on the grounds that the state is without
jurisdiction of the person, property, or business of the plaintiff, and that it gives plaintiff no protection, opportunities, or
benefits that would justify a tax. The record shows without
con1lict that plaintiff engages in substantial income-producing
activities in California. It has local offic~ here as well a...,
employees who devote their entire time to soliciting orders,
receiving payments. adjusting complaints, collecting delinquent accounts, and performing other Rervices for plaintiff.
This statE' provides a market in which plaintiff operate.'1 in
competition with local law-book publishers. Plaintjff'~ agent.'~
receive the same protection and other benefits from the state
as agents carrying on busines~ activities for a principal engaged in intrastate business. The state protects plaintiff's
business transactions within its borders and maintains courts
in which plaintiff enforce." payment for the sale of it~ publications. In West Publishing 00. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.
2d 720 [128 P.2d 777]: cert. den. 317 U.S. 700 f63 S.Ct. 524,
87 L.Ed. 559], it was held that by virtue of these activitie.'1
plaintiff is present in this state and subject to the jurisdiction
of its courts. (See. also, Frene v. Louisville Oement 00., 134
F .2d 511.) "The activities which establish its 'presence' subject it alike to taxation by the state and to suit to recover the
tax." (International Shoe 00. v. Washington, - - U.S. - [66 S.01. 154, 161, 90 L.Ed. - ] . )
The International Shoe ease, B1Lpra, settles any doubt as
to the validity of the tax in question under the due process
c)ause. That (!p.~e held that a Delaware corporation was subJect to suit in the courts of the State of Washington and was
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. liable under the statutes of that state fot contributions to the
state unemployment compensation ~md. The corporation
also contended that the state statute violated the commerce
clause, but the court held that there was no basis for that contention in view of a federal statute providin~ that "No person required under any State law to make payments to an
unemployment fund shan be relieved from compliance therewith on the ground that he is engaged in interstate commerce .
• . ." The activities of the International Shoe Company in
the State of W ashin~ton. which served as the constitutional
basis for the imposition of the tax there involved were less
extensive than the activities of plaintiff in this state. The
corporation's Washington activiti('s are described by the
United States Supreme Court as follows: "Appellant has no
office in Washington and make.<: no contracts either for sale or
purchase of merchandise there. It maintains no stock of merchandise in that state and make.~ there no deliverie.<s of goods
in intrastate commerce. During the years from 1937 to 1940.
now in que.'ltion. appellant employed eleven to thirteen sale.'lmen under direct supervision and control of sales manageI'H ,
located in St. Louis. These salesmen resided in Washington:
their principal activitie.'l were confined to that state; and they
were compensated by commiRsions based upon the amount of
their sales. Th(' commissions for each year totaled more than
$31.000. Appellant supplieR itR salesmen with a line of samples, each consisting of one shoe of a pair, which they display
to prospective purchasers. On occasion they rent permanent
sample rooms. for exhibiting sampleR in business buildings.
or rent rooms in hotelR or busine.'ls buildingR temporarily for
that purpose. The cost of ...-nch rentalR is reimbursed by ap- !
pellant. The authority of the ~aleRmen is limited to exhibiting·
their sample.~ and soliciting orders from prospective buyers.
at prices and on terms fixed by appellant. The salesmen transmit the ordcr!'l to appellant'!' office in St. Louis for acceptance .
or rejection, and when accepted the merchandise for filling
the orders is shipped f.o.b. from pointR out.'lide Washington
to the purchasers within the state. An the merchandise·
shipped into Washington iR invoiced at the place of shipment
from which collections are made. No salesman has authority
to enter into contract.q or to make collections." (66 S.Ct. 154.
157.) Although the corporation's only activitie.'l in the State
of Washington were those of itR ~Jesmen as described above.
and although those activities were exclusively in intersta~e
commerce, the court nevertheless held that the tax did not vio-
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latc the due process clause. .;L'his holding disposes of plaintiff's contention that a sta~ cannot exact a tax from a foreign
co'·poration engaged exclusively in interstate commerce without violating the due process clause. It also disposes of the contention that a corporation carrying 011 such activities as plaintiff's in California receives no protec~ion or benefits that would
justify a tax: "But to the extent that a corporation exercises
the privilege of conducting activf"ties within a state, it enjoys
the benefits and protection of the laws of that state ... the
activities carried on in behalf of appellant in the State of
Washington were neither irregular nor casual. They were
systematic and continuous throughout the years in question.
They resulted in a large volume of interstate business, in the
course of which appellant received the benefits and protection
of the laws of the state, including the right to resort to the
courts for the enforcement of its rights. . . . " (66 S.Ot. 154,
160.) The court held that the State of Washington had constitutional power to impose the tax and to subject appellant
to suit to recover it, and concluded its opinion with the statement quoted above that " ..• The activities which establish
its 'presence' subject it alike to taxation by the state and
to suit to recover the tax."
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk. J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., and
Spence, J., concurred.
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